From *Armenian Sebastia/Sivas and Lesser Armenia*,
Volume 5 in the series *Historic Armenian Cities and Provinces*,
edited by Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa, 2004),
Chapter 9, pp. 237-264.

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THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE AT SIVAS 1886-1908

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In 1886 the United States established its first consulate in the interior of Asiatic Turkey, in the city of Sivas (Sebastia/ Sepastia). The consulate remained the only United States diplomatic presence in the interior until the opening of consulates in Erzerum in 1896 and in Kharpert (Harput) in 1900.[1] The Sivas consulate functioned until 1908. These were eventful years during which the tensions escalated between the Ottoman government, on the one hand, and the Armenian people and the American missionaries in Turkey, on the other, leading to numerous major and minor incidents and culminating in the chaos of the 1894-96 massacres of the Armenian population during the reign of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1876-1908/09). The United States consul in Sivas was witness to much of this, sometimes acting as reporter, other times as investigator, often isolated and believing his life to be in jeopardy, and at all times a person from another nation and culture trying to understand and ameliorate conditions over which he had very little influence.

The reports filed by the American consul in Sivas contain a variety of material, from mundane financial reports to comprehensive analyses of the economic and political conditions in

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[1] On the establishment of U.S. consulates in Turkey, see Barbara J. Merguerian, "Kharpert: The View from the United States Consulate," *Armenian Tsopk/Kharpert*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2002), pp. 273-325. For a contemporary perspective in the memoirs of a British consul in the Turkish interior, see Robert Graves, *Storm Centres of the Near East: Personal Memories, 1879-1929* (London: Hutchinson, 1933).

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the province, from the investigation of disputes between missionaries and the government to eyewitness accounts about acts of extreme brutality. Through all of this period, the United States government wavered as it attempted to pursue its traditional foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of most countries outside the Western hemisphere, yet at the same time found itself called upon to protect the American missionaries and their properties in the Ottoman Empire and to secure for them the greatest possible latitude in the operation of their religious and educational programs.

To place these reports in context, it will be useful to consider the reasons for the establishment of the Sivas consulate, which in turn requires an examination of the major principles of United States-Turkish relations during this period. Such an examination will demonstrate that many of the fundamental issues between the two nations, in the century that followed the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1831, revolved around the work of the American missionaries, who (perhaps not entirely coincidentally) had commenced their activities in Turkey proper that same year. And since that missionary work touched in large measure the Armenians living on their ancestral lands encompassed in the Ottoman Empire, it follows that Armenians were often, in one way or another, the subjects of negotiations between the two governments and thus were affected by the course of that United States-Turkish relationship.

Substantial changes in American attitudes toward foreign affairs occurred in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Americans were beginning to emerge from the isolationism of their earliest history, and strong voices at home were calling for the nation to play a more active role in world affairs. As one aspect of the resulting new approaches to foreign policy, the United States was becoming more deeply interested in events taking place in Turkey. America was industrializing rapidly, and entrepreneurs were looking to overseas markets. The presence of American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire had acquainted the local population with American-made products and had in fact created a demand for them, even while widespread poverty, combined with the high cost of importing those goods, dimmed

the prospects for increasing trade.[2] Another impetus for change was the fact that during the early decades of their work in Turkey the American missionaries (most of whom served under the auspices of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, with headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts) had depended on the British Empire to protect their rights. Increasingly, however, they were expecting their own government to look out for their interests, and this when missionary activity in Turkey was rapidly expanding in scale and broadening in scope.[3] If earlier the missionary emphasis had been on individual religious conversion, now the programs were broadened, with a greater importance given to education and medical services. The last decades of the nineteenth century saw the establishment of higher educational institutions, as well as a greater openness of missionary programs to non-Protestants, many of them members of the Armenian Apostolic Church. At the same time that missionary work was growing, the Armenian national liberation movement was emerging. Whatever the correlation between these two events (the expansion of missionary programs and the rise of Armenian nationalism)—a complex question beyond the scope of this chapter—the fact that the two processes took place simultaneously led officials of the Turkish government to assume that the American missionaries and their schools were responsible for the Armenian unrest and even for the birth of Armenian revolutionary political parties.[4]

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[2] Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), pp. 119-20. Gordon attributes the low volume of trade between the United States and Turkey in the final decades of the nineteenth century to the British shipping monopoly in the Levant.

[3] On the cordial relations between the missionaries and the British, see David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 125-29. The British ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, played a leading role in the negotiations that resulted in the establishment of the Protestant millet in the Ottoman Empire in 1850. See Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 14.

[4] The missionary movement and U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey are discussed in Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy*. On missionary programs in Turkey, the standard works include James L. Barton, *Daybreak in Turkey* (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1908);

Initially the Turkish government had been on the whole indifferent to the work of the American missionaries. It interfered only when pressed to do so by the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople or by foreign governments (usually Russia). According to Ottoman traditional law, it was a crime punishable by death for a Muslim to convert to another faith. Even after the official proclamation of religious toleration in 1856, indirect pressures discouraged Muslims from participating in missionary programs. The Americans, therefore, carried on their work among the minorities of the country, principally the Armenians. But, beginning in the late 1860s and early 1870s, the Turkish government began to pay more attention, partly because the missionary programs were educating the Christian segment of the population and leaving the Muslim majority behind, and also because the attitudes of Armenians were being affected in ways the government did not understand and therefore feared. Laws were passed to regulate the missionary schools, and they were often administered arbitrarily by local officials, thus arousing the concern of the American missionaries, who had to depend on the U.S. legation in Constantinople to settle their problems with the local government and to address issues of their safety. In a time of primitive roads and undeveloped communications, these American missionaries understandably felt isolated and even threatened. The breakdown of law and order in rural areas left them at the mercy of brigands and thieves as they traveled between their various stations and outstations. It was under these circumstances that the missionaries and their supporters back home advocated the establishment of U.S. consulates in the Turkish interior, and it was because of their lobbying in Washington that the decision was made to open the first such consulate in the city of Sivas, capital of the province with the same name.[5]

Frank Andrews Stone, *Academies for Anatolia: A Study of the Rationale, Program and Impact of the Educational Institutions Sponsored by the American Board in Turkey: 1830-1980* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984); William E. Strong, *The Story of the American Board: An Account of the First Hundred Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1910).

[5] As early as 1858 American missionaries in the interior had called for U.S.

The Turkish government, however, already uneasy over the provision in the Treaty of Berlin (1878) that assigned the Great Powers in Europe with oversight in the implementation of reforms in the "provinces inhabited by Armenians" (among them Sivas), was not anxious to have yet another nation, the United States, involved in its affairs. Therefore, when on August 9, 1886, the U.S. legation in Constantinople forwarded a request for recognition of a U.S. consul in Sivas, the Turkish government refused on the grounds that U.S. commercial activity in Sivas was insufficient to warrant a consul. The United States countered with a protest in which it asserted that the 1830 treaty establishing diplomatic relations between the two nations had recognized America's right to consular representation wherever it deemed this necessary. The United States also argued that "whenever there are American citizens residing, there is need of an American Consul for their proper protection, and for bringing their wants and their rights to the knowledge of the local authorities, without long and expensive delays."[6] A U.S. consul was accordingly assigned and sent to Sivas; he arrived there on November 2, 1886. When the official papers were not forthcoming from the Turkish government, the envoy was instructed to close the consulate and leave. Before he could make the proper arrangements, however, the Ottoman government's recognition was received, and the U.S. consulate opened officially in Sivas on March 28, 1887.[7]

In the diplomatic exchange over this matter, a contrast emerges between the position of the Turkish government, which viewed the consul as an official responsible primarily for trade,

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government protection, in view of the "turbulent character" of the local population and distance from the American mission in Constantinople. See Merguerian, "View from the Consulate," p. 276.

[6] United States, National Archives, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Despatches from the U.S. Ministers to Turkey, 1818-1906 (also available in microcopy, M-46), vol. 45, no. 209, Aug. 9, 1886, and no. 259, encl. 1, Nov. 4, 1886.

[7] US Archives, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State , Despatches from the U.S. Consuls in Sivas, 1886-1906 (also available in microcopy, T-681), no. 4, Nov. 2, 1886, and no. 8, March 20, 1887, cited hereafter as Despatches from Sivas. See also Despatches from the U.S. Ministers to Turkey, no. 296, March 8, 1887, and no. 308, April 13, 1887.

and of the United States government, which defined the consul's role first and foremost as protector of American missionaries and their property. Another area of dispute between the two governments arose over the jurisdiction of the consul. According to Ottoman usage, consular jurisdiction normally was limited to the province (*vilayet*) to which it was assigned, in this case Sivas. U.S. rules defined a consular district as a certain city "and such other places as shall be nearer thereto than to the residence of any other Consul or Vice-Consul of the United States within the same allegiance." Thus, according to the U.S. definition, the consulate in Sivas was responsible for a wide area, spanning at first the provinces of Van, Mamuret ul-Aziz (Kharpert), Trebizond, and Diarbekir—a situation the consul described, in a clear understatement, as "impractical."[8]

Two brothers served successively as U.S. consuls in Sivas. They were the sons of a doctor, Fayette Jewett, who had been a missionary in Turkey. In fact, both of the brothers had close ties to Sivas province. H.A. Jewett, the first consul, was born in the city of Tokat and was taken to the United States as a young boy for his education. He was a member of the bar and had been editor of the *Malden City Press* (Massachusetts) before applying to fill the new consulate. He served in Sivas for slightly over five years, from March 1887 to July 1892. He was succeeded by his brother, Milo A. Jewett, who remained at this post until 1906. Born in the city of Sivas, Milo had been educated in the United States in the family of his uncle and namesake, who was a founder and the first president of Vassar College. The young Milo attended the public schools of Milwaukee, and later the seminary in Newbury, Vermont, and Harvard University. A graduate of Harvard Medical School in 1881, he had been employed for ten years as assistant superintendent of the State Hospital for the Insane at Danvers, Massachusetts, before accepting the office of consul at Sivas.[9]

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[8] Despatches from Sivas, no. 204, April 28, 1906.

[9] Despatches from Sivas, no. 1, Jan. 5, 1886; W.J. Anderson, "Consulate of the United States, Sivas, Turkey, July 10, 1901," handwritten report, in Record Group 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Records of the U.S. Consulate in Sivas, Turkey, vol. 2: Despatches (Sept. 2, 1893-Dec. 16, 1903).

Economic and Social Conditions

After opening the Sivas office, Consul H.A. Jewett filed a series of informative reports describing the general situation in the city and province in the late 1880s. He was quick to note the important strategic position of Sivas, commanding the approaches from the Russian and Persian frontiers, and described it as the center of a large grain district and close to rich but unexploited mineral deposits to the east and northeast. At the time Sivas was a six-day journey from Constantinople. Though he complained of the lack of data, Jewett supplied a great deal of information about local economic conditions to his superiors in Constantinople and Washington, very little of it encouraging to those who were seeking opportunities to expand U.S. trade. The province of Sivas had a population of about 900,000, Jewett reported, of whom 650,000 were Muslims, and the rest (that is, 250,000) Christians, including about 1,000 Protestants. Sivas, the provincial capital, had a population of 40,000.[10]

Agriculture was the main occupation, Jewett reported, and although the soil was very fertile, crop yields were low because of the very primitive system of cultivation. No labor-saving machinery of any kind was available, and the implements were probably the same as those used a thousand years earlier. The area adjacent to the city of Sivas, lying at a high altitude of about 4,500 feet above sea level, was adapted only to the cultivation of grain, while conditions in Amasia, Tokat, and Marsovan were conducive to producing an abundance of fruit (grapes, apples, pears, cherries, melons, peaches, plums, quince, and recently introduced small fruit such as strawberries and currants) and vegetables (potatoes, cabbage, lettuce, beans, onions, beets, and turnips). The lack of transport, however, was a major problem. Each district could produce for local consumption only. In Amasia and Tokat, in season, fruit remained rotting on the trees and on the ground, while at Sivas, an important potential market only 60 miles away, very little fruit was available. Merchandise had to be carried by camels, horses,

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[10] "Report on the Population, Trade and Agriculture in Sivas," Despatches from Sivas, no. 15, May 26, 1887.

and crude carts over very poor roads. There was no manufacture in the province, except for a few grist mills run by water power in Amasia and owned and operated by Germans. Whatever goods were manufactured, such as carpets, rough woolen cloth, yarn, and leather, were produced by people (mostly women) at home and using the "rudest appliances." The rich minerals of the province remained underdeveloped, as the result of the "short-sighted policy of the government regarding concessions for mines."[11]

Trade in the area was controlled by the Armenians, Jewett reported. The principal import was cloth, especially woolens from Germany and prints from England; other imports included velvets, silks, glass, and sugar from France, iron and copper from England, and coffee from Brazil. Formerly petroleum had been shipped from America, but that source had been largely supplanted by the cheaper Russian product, which was inferior in quality. Jewett envisioned opportunities for American business—for example, agricultural tools, saw mills, and machinery (there was not a single steam engine in the entire province, he wrote)—but it would take some effort to induce the local population to use modern implements. The consul also believed that American textiles could compete with the British, if transport costs could be controlled. The "very intricate" system of land tenure was designed to keep land in Muslim hands, but the landowners possessed neither the skill nor the inclination to develop it. The farmer was at the mercy of the wealthy landowner and always in debt. Twenty years earlier silk had been a principal industry in Amasia, but a disease broke out, killing the silk worms; the Germans in Amasia were now trying to revive the industry, using modern methods.

Rugs were important to the local economy, the consul reported. All the work needed to produce rugs (dying, spinning, and weaving) was done in the home, and the products were therefore no larger than four by eight feet. The maker usually went from house to house to sell the rugs, which were woven entirely of wool; the common people often invested their savings in carpets, selling them when they needed money. Often

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[11] Ibid.

one would see the most beautiful rugs in the poorest houses. Given the mountainous terrain, poor roads, and primitive vehicles, the only way the province could develop economically was through the construction of a railroad. The consul believed that improved means of transportation in Sivas would result in a tremendous boast to the economy, and he reported in detail on various proposal by Western interests to lay a railway from the coast.[12]

Political conditions were also reported by the Sivas consul, though on an irregular basis. Especially interesting is a twenty-page handwritten report filed by Milo Jewett in 1895 on the "Armenian revolutionary organization" in Sivas. This appears to be a fairly accurate description despite the author's comments on the difficulty of verifying information about a very secret organization.[13] The revolutionary organization is not named, but from the description it is clear that Jewett is referring to the Hnchakian party. The consul noted the "poverty, ignorance, injustice and misrule" that rested heavily on the Armenians of Turkey (and indeed on all Ottoman subjects except the "official class") and described the effects of the Bulgarian freedom drive and the diplomatic disappointment suffered by the Armenians at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when their political aspirations had been summarily brushed aside. Origins of the movement in Sivas were traced to the establishment of a school in Tokat by the educator and intellectual Mikhail (Mkrtich) Portukalian, in which "a spirit of national independence" was cultivated "by means of patriotic songs and dissertations on national history." Though the educator was soon sent into exile, "the seeds which Portukalian had sown at Tokat continued to grow and spread throughout the chief cities of the region."[14] According to the consul: "The education which the Armenians

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[12] Despatches from Sivas, no. 15, May 26, 1887, no. 28, Sept. 28, 1887, no. 32, March 1, 1888, no. 53, April 8, 1889, and no. 62, July 22, 1889.

[13] Despatches from Sivas, no. 52, Feb. 26, 1895.

[14] Jewett's description of the Armenian revolutionary movement in Sivas corresponds in general with the assessment in the much later study of Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), esp. pp. 90-94.

were receiving in missionary schools and in foreign countries tended to open their eyes to the hardships of despotic misrule and prepared the Armenians to more readily accept the revolutionary idea." Jewett argued that the government itself "in its blind way" helped the movement, first by overzealous suppression of any national expression, banning even the use of the word "Armenia," and by imprisoning large numbers of Armenians, including children, for possession of literature considered subversive. This treatment had the opposite effect from that intended, for it both increased the sense of being persecuted while at the same time teaching the Armenians that "they were strong enough to be feared by the government." Besides, corrupt government officials realized that they could make money (and gain recognition) by arresting innocent Armenians and charging them with sedition or treason. They would later collect a bribe from their victims or their families to set them free. "Thus the 'Armenian Question' was greatly cultivated as a source of revenue to the officials, and they refused to let it die out." The central government had to some extent recognized this when it issued an imperial edict that no decorations or other favors would be given for zeal shown in prosecuting the Armenians, the consul reported.

The actual organizing work for the revolutionary society, Jewett continued, had been carried out by Russian Armenians, who entered the country between 1888 and 1890. In 1891, nine delegates from nine cities met at Marsovan "to perfect the organization," setting up committees in all the principal cities of the region (Marsovan, Amasia, Yozgat, Sivas, Caesarea, Shabin-Karahisar, Divrig, and Gurun). There were about a dozen "active members" and twenty-five to fifty "associate members" in each city. According to Jewett, the major accomplishment of the society, aside from collecting money and small amounts of arms, was to increase "the hatred of the Turks towards Armenians and the suspicion of the government against missionaries and foreign influence." During the previous three years, Jewett estimated, in Sivas alone, about 6,000 suspects had been arrested: 1 had been executed, about 10 exiled, 12 killed while resisting, and 25 sentenced to death, 30 to life imprisonment, and 200 to various terms of imprisonment. The vast majority

had been released upon the payment of bribes. Of those sentenced, "many were condemned on very insufficient evidence," and doubtless many were set free who were equally, or even more, guilty. Indeed, the only real evidence against the revolutionaries came from their fellow Armenians, out of motives of jealousy, treachery, or cowardice. A military commission authorized by the central government had during the previous four months been investigating the cases of political prisoners at Yozgat, Amasia, Marsovan, and Tokat and had let go several hundred suspects. In summary, Jewett cited the "insignificance" of the Armenian revolutionary movement, because of its small numbers, lack of arms, and what he considered the general unfitness of Armenians for self-government. Nonetheless the movement was important because of "its power to disturb the social order, to attract attention, and secure the intervention of foreign powers ready to profit by the occasion." Jewett also noted that the Turks, "who have as much reason for wishing an amelioration of the corrupt, ruinous government as the Armenians," had themselves formed "essentially revolutionary" organizations.

The Gathering Storm

The major responsibility of the consulate was to protect American citizens and their interests, and these were largely connected with the American missionaries. The two jewels in the missionary enterprise in this part of Turkey were Anatolia College in Marsovan and the Teachers' College in Sivas. Students in these institutions came from a network of primary and secondary schools in the province and beyond. It is interesting that, although "the laws and administration of the College bar no student from the free exercise of his religion," the student body of Anatolia College was largely Armenian: in 1888, out of 135 students, 108 were Armenian and the remaining 27 were Greek. The college was located on a four-acre site, "finely situated on the highest part of the city." The annual budget for the college and the theological seminary totaled $20,000 from the American endowment and $4,400 from local

resources.[15] Although the college was open to Muslims (indeed the administration would have welcomed such students with open arms), in fact Muslims did not attend American institutions at that time, and they seem to have looked upon these schools with a mixture of envy, distrust, disapproval, and misunderstanding. A telling incident occurred in 1891, when the governor of Sivas gave the commencement address at Anatolia College in which he endorsed the educational work taking place there. While visiting the facility, he appeared especially impressed with the Girls' School, and during a meeting with President George F. Herrick requested a student from the school as governess for his own children. This request was impossible to grant, the missionaries later explained, "as no parent would consent to his daughter's accepting." The next year, when the governor once again attended commencement exercises, the missionaries reported that, "though polite, [he] seemed less cordial, and made no allusion to the matter of the governess."[16]

At the time, there were approximately twenty-five American missionaries in Sivas province and an additional fifty in the interior provinces of Van, Erzerum, Diarbekir, and Kharpert. While the protection of the missionaries and their property might seem at first glance to be a straightforward assignment, in practice major gray areas emerged that were open to conflicting interpretations. The duty to protect missionary schools and property was clear enough, but how about schools owned and operated by Armenians but financed, in whole or in part, by Americans? There was another vexing problem: to what extent, if any, was the United States government responsible for the personnel of the missionary establishments? The United States clearly did not have the right to intervene to protect the rights of school personnel who were Ottoman subjects; on the other hand, the United States could not stand idly by while the Turk-

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[15] Despatches from Sivas, no. 25, Sept. 15, 1887. On Anatolia College, see Stone, *Academies*, esp. chap. 9.

[16] Memorandum D, enclosed in Minister David Thompson (Constantinople) to Secretary of State Gresham, no. 47, March 7, 1893. See United States, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1893* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1894), pp. 613-14, cited hereafter as *FRUS*.

ish government hampered the operation of the schools by arbitrarily arresting and generally harassing the teaching staff. In these issues, the consul in Sivas followed overall policy set by the State Department in Washington and the U.S. legation in Constantinople, but all too often these policies were unclear, representing as they often did grudging Ottoman concessions to U.S. demands.

A vivid illustration of this dilemma, and of the relations between the missionary schools, the Turkish government, and the United States, appeared in the first major incident that took place following the establishment of the Sivas consulate—the burning of the new Girls' School building at Anatolia College in Marsovan in early 1893. The troubles could be traced back five years earlier, when the local government informed the mission in Marsovan that its schools, including the college, must obtain an imperial permit or else they would be closed. This was a response to a new Turkish education act, which had serious consequences for American schools throughout the empire.[17] The mission (in Marsovan and elsewhere) took the position that their schools had been implicitly recognized by the government for many years and that to apply now for permits for existing schools would amount to asking for rights they already possessed. This stance was supported by the U.S. legation in Constantinople. When it was decided to build a new Girls' School at Anatolia College, however, the mission applied, and obtained, local permits for its construction.[18] A three-story building, 100 feet long by 45 to 55 feet wide, it had been walled and roofed when the catastrophe struck.

The somewhat uneasy relations between the college and local officials had been exacerbated after the night of January 5, 1893, when hundreds of placards, written in Ottoman Turkish and calling upon the oppressed people of Turkey to demand reforms from the government, appeared on buildings through-

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[17] The education act, requiring all foreign schools to obtain an official permit, had been issued in the late 1860s but was not vigorously enforced until twenty years later. See, for example, the exchanges reproduced in *FRUS, 1887* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 1083-1114.

[18] Memorandum C, Enclosed in Despatch, March 7, 1893, in *FRUS, 1893*, pp. 613-14.

out Anatolia, in Turkish and Circassian as well as Armenian villages. Two of the placards which had been posted at Anatolia College were immediately removed when they were discovered by the administration. The broad and simultaneous distribution of such a large number of placards, however, indicating as it did the existence of an efficient and large secret organization, alarmed the Turkish authorities and galvanized them into action. In the ensuing days and weeks, hundreds of Armenians were arrested, much to the surprise of the Americans, who thought it just as likely that Turkish groups had been responsible for the placards. The official investigation immediately focused on Anatolia College as one of the few sites in the area possessing the facility to reproduce such large numbers of placards. In charge of the official investigation was the police chief of the province, a notoriously corrupt individual named Hosref Pasha, who made no secret of his conviction that the college had been responsible for the placards and that the only way to end the troubles was to destroy the college. One month later, on the evening of February 2, fire engulfed and destroyed the Girls' School building, which was still under construction. If the fire had not been discovered at an early stage by one of the teachers who quickly sounded the alarm, it could easily have been disastrous to the 155 men, women, and children then sleeping in its wake.[19]

Consul Milo Jewett was immediately instructed to go to Marsovan and conduct an investigation into "the causes of the destruction of the college building by fire" and also "to examine into the attitude of the officials generally towards the school."[20]

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[19] Jewett's preliminary report on his investigation was enclosed in the dispatch of March 7, 1893 to Washington from Constantinople. See *FRUS, 1893*, pp. 609-11.

[20] Jewett never received the initial instructions from the U.S. Minister in Constantinople, David P. Thompson, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Marsovan fire. See *FRUS, 1893*, p. 597, no. 28, Feb. 3, 1893. Because Sivas was a considerable distance from Marsovan, the German vice consul at Amasia was requested, through the German ambassador in Constantinople, to look into the events at Anatolia College and "to give all protection in his power" to the Americans there. See *FRUS, 1893*, pp. 593-94, no. 24, Feb. 5, 1893. Nor did Jewett's letters dated February 4, 11, and 14 reach Thompson. The instructions from Thompson were repeated on February 28 (Despatches from the U.S. Ministers to Turkey, no. 42, March 1, 1893). Thompson expressed his concern to the State Department that

By the time Jewett received these instructions (for communication was extremely slow and unreliable), new problems had arisen, as the government officials interrogated college staff members and charged two senior Armenian members of the faculty (Professors Garabed Toumayan and Hovhannes Kayayan) with sedition. The government also charged that radical Armenian students had been responsible for the fire. Lacking any confidence in the ability or willingness of the Turkish government to conduct an impartial investigation, the U.S. minister in Constantinople instructed that college personnel be questioned by government officials only in the consul's presence.

The subsequent report by Jewett, who spent several weeks in Marsovan during the investigation, was inconclusive, though it gave the distinct impression that the fire had been set at the direction of the police chief, who had voiced hostility to the college and mission, and that the evidence presented against the two professors was not convincing. As a result of negotiations based on Jewett's report, the government paid an indemnity to the college for the destruction caused by the fire and issued an official permit to rebuild the damaged building; the two Armenian faculty members sentenced to death, having been found guilty of engaging in revolutionary activity, were instead exiled abroad; and after a long delay and protracted exchanges, Anatolia College was granted an official *irade*, or charter.[21]

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the diplomatic correspondence had been intercepted, citing the assertion by Turkish officials of the right "to open letters and examine them at any time when there is a disturbance in the section of the country the letters are sent to or from." This brought an angry response from Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham, who ordered an investigation and expressed amazement that the Turkish government might "so far lose sight of one of the most obvious and indispensable prerogatives of foreign diplomatic representation as to violate private correspondence between recognized agents of the United States." See RG 59, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906, Turkey, vol. 5, no. 54, March 17, 1893 (also available in microcopy, M77).

[21] The Turkish government turned over £500 to the U.S. minister in Constantinople in compensation to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions for the fire damage at Anatolia College, as reported on April 27, 1893 (*FRUS, 1893*, p. 631). Despite repeated efforts, the *irade* for the college was not issued until May 2, 1895. See *FRUS, 1895* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1896), p. 1236.

The point was clearly made that the Turkish government could not harm U.S. institutions arbitrarily and that the United States, while it did not claim to be protector of the rights of the Armenian employees of the mission, would take action on behalf of these people in order to protect the missionary work. This right was confirmed the following year according to an informal agreement reached between U.S. Minister Alexander W. Terrell in Constantinople and the Sublime Porte (as the Ottoman government was known). As a newly appointed official, Terrell misread instructions from Washington and therefore demanded the right to have a representative present during the trial of Armenian teachers in American colleges. When an exasperated Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham reprimanded Terrell, wiring in cipher, "You will not insist the Government of the Porte shall agree in advance that it will not arrest its own subjects for violating its own laws without your consent," Terrell replied that he had demanded only that the United States have a representative present in the case of such arrests and that "this has been conceded, and it doesn't much matter whether it is a privilege or a right."[22] Despite this informal agreement, the question of United States protection for native staff members of missionary schools and colleges continued to be a contentious one.[23]

The second major event that took place during this period was the massacre in Sasun in the fall of 1894, arousing international attention and demands for outside intervention. Here was a test of the extent to which the United States was willing to become involved in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and the presence of Consul Jewett in Sivas was propitious. As

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[22] See Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, Turkey, Telegrams from Acting Secretary of State Edwin F. Uhl, Oct. 3, 1894, and from Gresham, Oct. 29, 1894. See also Despatches from the U.S. Ministers to Turkey, no. 329, Oct. 29, 1894, and no. 331, Nov. 5, 1894.

[23] Anatolia College was not the only American higher educational institution hampered by the government during this period. For example, on April 1, 1893, an Armenian professor at Euphrates College in Kharpert was arrested on charges of sedition, and his books and papers were seized. Jewett reported the incident to Constantinople following a trip to Kharpert. See Despatches from Sivas, vol. 4 (June 5, 1886-August 22, 1893), no. 26, June 24, 1893.

reports of a major massacre of Armenians in the remote mountains of Sasun were confirmed and the extent of the destruction and death became apparent, the Turkish government's official position that an Armenian insurrection had taken place or that the incident was not serious became all the less tenable. Trying to forestall a major intervention by the Great Powers, which could have been justified under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, Sultan Abdul-Hamid made a surprising move, asking that President Grover Cleveland appoint an American representative to the Turkish commission being formed to go to Sasun to look into the matter. The U.S. minister in Constantinople, Alexander Terrell, recommended to his superiors in Washington that the U.S. consul in Sivas was available and qualified for this delicate mission. President Cleveland, however, apparently caught off guard by the request and in any case a firm advocate of a conservative, limited foreign policy, immediately turned down Abdul-Hamid's request. This left the sultan with no way to prevent an investigation by the Great Powers of Great Britain, France, and Russia. New reports in the Western press and from the U.S. legation in Constantinople of Turkish atrocities against the Armenians convinced Cleveland to change his mind three days later and agree to the appointment of Jewett, though with certain conditions to insure his independence. Once the Great Powers had become involved, however, Abdul-Hamid had no further interest in having the United States complicate the situation and he accordingly withdrew his invitation for American participation.

Public opinion in the United States was outraged by the sultan's rejection of an American representative, and an angry editorial in the *New York Times* denounced the Turkish government for its refusal to accept Jewett as an observer on the investigatory commission. Delicate negotiations ensued in Constantinople between the two governments, highlighted by a three-hour interview during which Abdul-Hamid made the "urgent request" to Terrell that President Cleveland "will appreciate the present great embarrassment of the Turkish government" and "withdraw his demand for Jewett's appointment." At first the United States pressed the issue, but eventually the matter was

quietly dropped.[24]

In his 1895 message to Congress, the president expressed regret that the proposal to send the U.S. consul at Sivas to investigate "the true condition of affairs in the disturbed quarter of the Ottoman Empire" had been "thwarted" by the objections of the Turkish government. Cleveland explained:

> This movement on our part was in no sense meant as a gratuitous entanglement of the United States in the so-called Eastern question, nor as an officious interference with the right and duty which belong by treaty to certain great European powers, calling for their intervention in political matters affecting the good government and religious freedom of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Sultan, but it arose solely from our desire to have an accurate knowledge of the conditions in our efforts to care for those entitled to our protection.[25]

In this incident the ambivalent position of the United States was evident—on the one hand not wishing to become involved in what was viewed as a European matter and yet unwilling or unable to remain entirely aloof in an area where American citizens were active and where human rights were being violated on such a large scale.

The 1895 Massacres

The third major event to overtake the Sivas consulate was the turmoil of the 1895 massacres. Here it becomes clear that if the missionaries believed that the presence of a U.S. consul in Sivas could forestall this kind of savagery, they were mistaken. There was little a consul could do except witness the events and

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[24] "Message of the President to the Senate of the United States," Dec. 11, 1894, in *FRUS, 1894* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1895), pp. 714-16; Ralph Elliott Cook, "The United States and the Armenian Question, 1849-1924," Ph.D. Dissertation (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1957), pp. 46-50; Barbara J. Merguerian, "The American Response to the Armenian Massacres of 1895: A Foreign Policy Dilemma," *Genocide and Human Rights: Lessons from the Armenian Experience*, special issue of the *Journal of Armenian Studies* 4:1-2 (1992): 53-55.

[25] *FRUS, 1895*, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

demand protection from the local officials. It is true that, while Sivas province suffered the full fury of the massacres, American assets were not harmed in any way. This contrasts to the situation in other areas, notably Marash and Kharpert, where mission property was destroyed and American lives were in serious danger.

The first intimation of the coming storm appears in Jewett's dispatch on the local political situation, dated October 29, 1895: "For weeks and months we have been in rather trying suspense, anticipating with anxiety the massacres which have long been threatened and awaiting the reforms long promised." As causes of the tension the consul cited the zeal of revolutionary Armenians, racial hatred expressed by fanatical Turks, and the restless lawlessness of plundering Kurds and Circassians. While serious violence had been avoided in Sivas, Jewett wrote that three weeks earlier (on October 6) Armenian males in Trebizond had been butchered, leaving an estimated 583 dead. Turks blamed the Armenians for starting demonstrations, but the Turks had been responsible for the violence, "assisted by the Turkish soldiers, who neglected to stop the riots and joined in the looting." Later, an extensive massacre was reported in Erzinjan. In Sivas, Jewett wrote, Armenians talked of presenting a reform petition at the consulate; but as a measure of the United States determination to refrain from involvement in Turkish affairs, the would-be demonstrators were warned that they would not be admitted into the courtyard and would be shot if they entered the premises. Another source of anxiety appeared in the form of the Dersim Kurds, who reportedly crossed over the local border into Sivas province, plundering villages, carrying off sheep and cattle, and killing a reported 400 Armenians. The military force in the province was put at about 100 soldiers and 200 gendarmes, with an additional 150 soldiers and 100 gendarmes recently enlisted and placed on duty. "They are about as lawless, undisciplined, and irresponsible a lot of men as could be found in any country," the consul observed.[26]

Subsequent dispatches recount the escalation of violence in the fall of 1895. On November 9, Jewett described the pillage

[26] Despatches from Sivas, no. 63, Oct. 29, 1895.

and destruction in nearby areas. While no massacres had been reported as yet in the major cities of Sivas, and the loss of life had not been as great as in other places, it had been serious and "probably illustrative of similar events in other provinces." No less than forty Armenian towns and villages locally had been plundered, Jewett wrote, and an estimated 500 Armenians and fifteen Muslims killed. Again, the instigation of the violence was attributed to Dersim Kurds, who became bolder as they went along and were assisted by an increasing number of Turks. The claim of the Turkish government that Armenians were responsible for the violence, the consul observed, was weak in the face of the fact that almost all of the villages attacked (and the overwhelming number of people killed) were Armenian. Villages only a few hours from Sivas had been looted: "This easy and unpunished method of getting rich had found attraction and the scum of Sivas has gone out to profit by the occasion." Seeking to explain the violence, Jewett wrote, "The apparent indifference and inactivity of the government almost leads one to suppose that the government allowed the Armenians to be punished and their compatriotic numbers reduced." The following day, November 10, the consul reported a massacre in nearby Malatia, during which the adult male Christian had been killed and attractive women carried off. Now Armenian villages only one hour distant had been attacked.[27]

The dreaded violence struck Sivas city on November 12. On that day, at the command of the government, Armenian shopkeepers were ordered to open their stores as usual, Jewett reported. Following the pattern established in other areas, at about 11:00 in the morning, Muslims rushed on Armenians, killing them and plundering their shops. The rioters were mostly of the "young, rough class," immigrants from Kars, and military forces of the city. At first clubs were used, but as the soldiers and police rushed in and began to shoot Armenians, "the bazibozooks [*bashibozuks*; irregulars] began to use swords, daggers, and firearms, with terrible effect." Few were left wounded, and if so the job was soon finished. On the basis of personal observation and corroborating testimony, Jewett wrote,

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[27] Ibid., nos. 65-66, Nov. 9-10, 1895.

there was not a shadow of a doubt that the soldiers and police were as actively engaged in killing and looting as the other Muslims and that the government made no serious attempt to stop the carnage until about 9 a.m. the next day. Over the following three to four days the killing gradually ceased. Reasons given for the violence varied, but "whether justly or unjustly the Muslims think the government wanted them to kill and ruin the Armenians, and the conduct of government soldiers and police corroborates this."[28] Turkish sources estimated that 1,200 Armenians had been killed in Sivas, and only four Muslims. Subsequently, "those most responsible for the outrage are organized by the government into a commission to investigate and reestablish peace and friendship," Jewett wrote. Meanwhile no Muslims had been arrested. "It is said that not a single Armenian village in this part of the country remains unruined except one which the government protects and another which is Catholic."[29] The consulate itself was guarded, if halfheartedly, by Turkish soldiers, who departed regularly to seize their share of the spoils. Throughout this period the U.S. minister in Constantinople repeatedly demanded that the Turkish government assign military guards to U.S. consulates and mission stations in the troubled areas.[30]

The massive violence of 1895 demonstrated the difficulties of the U.S. consulate and its inability to affect the course of events. The missionaries had argued that the presence of a U.S. consul would keep unruly mobs in check and prevent this kind of savagery—but clearly they overestimated the power of a consul and underestimated the brutality of the mob. The United States was not in a position to use military force, other than naval vessels operating in the Mediterranean, to enforce its objectives. In the early 1880s, the secretary of state told the newly appointed minister to Turkey that he would have a problem similar to those of predecessors "to maintain American prestige without visible evidence of military power."[31] During

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[28] Ibid., no. 67, Nov. 16, 1895.
[29] Ibid., no. 69, Nov. 22, 1895.
[30] Ibid., nos.71-72, Dec. 14, 16, 1895.
[31] Quoted in William N. Still, Jr., *American Sea Power in the Old World: The*

the crisis of 1894 to 1897, ships of the U.S. European fleet were frequently sent to Turkish coastal cities, where their senior officers reported conditions to be calm and peaceful, much to the consternation of the missionaries living in the midst of bloodshed in the interior.[32] The 1895 events foreshadowed the future, and subsequent consular reports from Sivas were full of warnings about the inevitability of new violence unless major changes were instituted. No action was taken, and events moved inexorably to the great catastrophe of 1915.[33]

In the wake of the massacre, the consul could do little but participate in the relief effort. Jewett was ordered to Marsovan to survey the situation there, and then on to Constantinople, where he was asked to investigate the Turkish government's charge of sedition against missionary George Knapp, who had been serving in Bitlis. In the capital, Jewett met Red Cross director Clara Barton, who had arrived from the United States with her staff on a mission to provide relief to surviving Armenians. He assisted her with travel arrangements into the Turkish interior.[34] Back at his post he headed the ad hoc committee, consisting mainly of missionaries, which was charged with overseeing the administration of relief. Among the consular reports can be found a full accounting of the distribution of some $200,000 worth of assistance in the province over a span of the next five years. It is interesting to note that the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople, in allocating $10,000 in aid to its churches in the area, did so through the auspices of the relief committee, something that would have been unthinkable

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United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 79.

[32] Ibid., pp. 91-132. Still argues (p. 132) that naval historians have underestimated the role of the Armenian crisis as providing justification for the expansion of the U.S. navy in this period.

[33] In his final message to Congress, President Cleveland recognized the "deep feeling and sympathy that have been aroused among our people" regarding "murder and pillage in Turkey," but warned against the tendency to "demand impossible things," offering instead the presence of U.S. naval vessels in the Mediterranean "as a measure of caution and to furnish all possible relief and refuge in case of emergency." See "Message of the President," Dec. 7, 1896, in *FRUS, 1896* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897), pp. xviii-xix.

[34] Ibid., no. 76, March 14, 1896.

in earlier decades of hostility and mistrust between the Armenian Church and the Protestant missions.[35]

In Search of a United States Policy

The long-running differences between the Ottoman and U.S. governments over the status of naturalized American citizens (the large majority of them Armenian) who returned to Turkey for personal or business reasons after obtaining citizenship in the United States created problems of interpretation for the Sivas consul. The Turkish government, basing citizenship on birth, did not recognize the returning naturalized Armenians as U.S. citizens except in the unlikely case that they had left Turkey with the expressed permission of the sultan. The United States, on the other hand, claimed it had the right and the responsibility to protect such individuals. The dispute had its origins in conflicting interpretations of the 1830 treaty establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries and in the contradictory provisions of the nationality law approved in the United States in 1868 and the Turkish statute promulgated in 1869 dealing with expatriation. The differences were bridged by a naturalization treaty negotiated in 1874, but it was never ratified.[36]

President Cleveland offered a compromise to deal with the problem when, on December 4, 1893, in his annual message to Congress, he recognized the right of the Turkish government to expel naturalized Armenians. This right "to exclude any or all classes of aliens" Cleveland defined as "an attribute of sovereignty," but the president added that American diplomats in Turkey were "expected to protect [naturalized Armenians] from unnecessary harshness of treatment." As interpreted by the Department of State and the U.S. legation in Constantinople, the Turkish government's right of exclusion did not extend to such

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[35] Jewett's detailed report on Armenian relief work in Sivas is included in Despatch no. 123, April 6, 1900.

[36] Negotiations dragged on until 1889, when representatives of the two governments agreed on the text of a new treaty, but it never came into effect for lack of the sultan's signature. See Cook, "The Armenian Question," pp. 14-16.

actions as the arbitrary arrest, punishment, or maltreatment of individuals for no reason other than the fact that they had obtained U.S. citizenship. The United States in many instances deplored the refusal or inability of the Turkish government to understand that its right to expel certain classes of people did not include punitive treatment of such persons as if they were criminals.[37] Development of a clear and coherent policy in these cases was complicated by the fact that during this period the Sublime Porte did not allow naturalized Armenians to reenter Turkey. Armenian Americans returning to Sivas for business or family reasons, therefore, had to travel on their old Ottoman passports and often encountered problems in establishing their rights as U.S. citizens.

It is not surprising that this policy was difficult to enforce. In August 1895, Jewett asked for instructions from the U.S. consul general in Constantinople in the case of twelve naturalized Armenians in Kharpert who "may be arrested on the charge of aiding the revolution" and "will probably claim the protection of the United States." Minister Terrell's reply, through the consul general in Constantinople, showed impatience that Jewett was unaware of U.S. policy, noting that "if a naturalized American citizen of Turkish origin—no matter what his race or religion—whose passport has not expired and who is known to be in Turkey temporarily, is imprisoned by Turkish officers on mere suspicion of any offense, Consul Jewett's duty is to demand his prompt release." A mere charge of rebellion would not justify imprisonment, Terrell advised, "unless he has committed some overt act in aid of an effort to destroy the authority of the Turkish government." In the latter case, "it is the duty of the nearest consul to secure a fair trial." In another case, Terrell faulted Jewett for his failure to protest the deten-

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[37] "Message of the President," Dec. 4. 1893, in *FRUS, 1893*, p. x. See also Instructions of the Department of State, Turkey, no. 161, March 29, 1894, and Despatches of the U.S. Ministers in Turkey, no. 323, Oct. 15, 1894. Cleveland admitted in his annual message the following year that "numerous questions" had arisen over his earlier statement and asserted: "While this government acquiesces in the asserted right of expulsion, it will not consent that Armenians may be imprisoned or otherwise punished for no other reason than having acquired without Imperial consent American citizenship." See *FRUS, 1894*, p. xv.

tion and imprisonment of U.S. citizen Krikor Arakelian, on the "spurious grounds" that "American citizens of Armenian origin were not entitled to the protection of the United States," and complained of Jewett's apparent "gross ignorance of his official duties."[38]

Relations between the consuls and the local governmental authorities shifted constantly. In January 1893, several months after Milo Jewett arrived in Sivas, he boasted about the ease of conducting consular affairs: "Owing to the cordial relations existing between the U.S. Consul and the Turkish authorities, most of the business is accomplished in a friendly and semi-official manner and is not always a matter of record." A few months later, after the fire at Anatolia College, the situation changed. On September 2, 1893, Jewett was writing to the U.S. legation in Constantinople to call for the dismissal of the local *vali* or governor: "It seems to me that the welfare of American interests, the interests of foreign Christians generally residing in this province and also the interests of the Turkish government demand the immediate replacing of the present Vali Halil Bey, by a more judicious, more honest and less vindictive man." In giving his reasons for this request, Jewett noted that Halil Bey appeared "to feel very sore over the 'Marsovan incident' and seems determined to get even for that affair" and charged that the governor let it be made known to lower officials that "it is dangerous for them to have anything to do with the Marsovan missionaries." According to Jewett, the vali prohibited Armenians from visiting the consulate, and when he was reprimanded by the minister of the interior for his discourtesy, Halil Bey imprisoned one of the most intelligent and popular Armenians, Dr. Karekeen, who was supposed to have been responsible for reporting the governor's conduct to the authorities. Another Armenian who worked closely with the missionaries, Dr. Melcom Altounian (a brother-in-law of Dr. Karekeen), was told by the vali that he would be put in prison unless he gave up his position at the college and all connection with the

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[38] Jewett's message to Consul General Luther Short is encl. 2 and Short's reply is encl. 5 in Despatches from the U.S. Ministers to Turkey, no. 616, Sept. 5, 1895. See also no. 613, Sept. 3, 1895.

missionaries.[39]

The Jewett brothers recognized the importance of the U.S. consulate in Sivas, but both found the position itself difficult and undesirable. H.A. Jewett first submitted a request for a transfer to another station after only sixteen months on the job, on March 15, 1888. In his letter to the Department of State, he noted that "owing to the peculiar character of the Turkish government and its attitude to foreigners, contingencies may arise at any moment when the duties of the office would be very important for the protection of American citizens and properties in Asia Minor." Nonetheless, "these contingencies arise so seldom that, in the absence of commercial relations between the two countries, the ordinary duties of the post are less engrossing than I would wish." When the State Department failed to respond to his repeated requests for a transfer, Jewett resigned in August 1890, although he remained at his post until a successor was named in 1892. In explaining his reasons, the consul cited the post's "disagreeableness, expensive living, remoteness from civilization, lack of society and other disadvantages." A more basic reason was his recognition of the difficulties in attaining peace and reconciliation in the area and the incumbent potential dangers. He was aware of the ominous tensions in the local society which threatened to break into bloodshed at the slightest provocation. At the same time, Jewett understood his own powerlessness to deal with a crisis, particularly in the absence of a clear U.S. policy to be followed in such cases. In prophetic terms he pleaded with the State Department to give his successor "special instructions as to his powers and course of action in protecting the interests of Armenians in the interior of the country in case of war or insurrection." He pointed out: "Should there be war, and especially should it result unfavorably to this government, the condition of the Christian population might for the moment be a precarious one, exposed as they would likely be to the fanaticism of the dominant race and being so far (six days journey) from the sea coast." Anticipating possible problems in the future, the consul should be instructed

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[39] Despatches from Sivas, no. 15, Jan. 6, 1893. Jewett's letter, no. 61, Sept. 19, 1893, is in *FRUS, 1893*, pp. 681-82.

"as to what extent, if any, he is authorized to grant asylum to those not citizens of the United States."[40] There is no evidence that his superiors in Washington paid any heed to the consul's advice.

Indeed the community of Westerners in Sivas was very small. In addition to two or three missionary families, there was a British vice consulate, which was housed in the same building as the American consulate. At first the only other Westerners in the area were the sisters of a Jesuit school, but later officials were appointed for the Tobacco Regie and the Indemnity Fund.[41] For a time in the 1890s, when the British consulate was vacant, Dr. Jewett was asked to serve as the honorary British consul. Washington vetoed such an appointment but did allow Jewett to represent British interests temporarily. When, however, the State Department learned that Jewett was submitting reports about conditions in the area (specifically the treatment of the Armenians) directly to the British consul in Trebizond without going through official U.S. channels, it was highly displeased and ordered Jewett to cease such activity. Apparently, the Turkish government had lodged a protest about the matter. The British government, on the other hand, was most appreciative of Jewett's services.

In the aftermath of the massacres of 1895, Consul Milo A. Jewett did not wish to remain at his post any longer and pleaded with his superiors to assign him elsewhere. Putting aside the fact that Sivas, even under normal conditions, was a "very undesirable place to live in . . . with scarcely any of the advantages of civilization" (a situation exacerbated by the low consular pay, he hastened to add), Jewett pointed to the grave political situation. "For about a year past, we have been in con-

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[40] Despatches from Sivas, no. 34, March 15, 1888, no. 90, Aug. 31, 1890, and no. 114, Nov. 3, 1891.

[41] Life in Sivas during these years is depicted by Edwin W. Martin in the missionary biography, *The Hubbards of Sivas: A Chronicle of Love and Faith* (Santa Barbara: Fithian Press, 1991), and by missionary C. Henry Holbrook, "Impressions of Sivas (Sebastia)," *Journal of Armenian Studies* 5:1 (1990-91): 37-71. See also *Against the Gates of Hell: The Life & Times of Henry Perry, A Christian Missionary in a Moslem World,* Gordon and Diana Severance, eds. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003).

stant danger of having our throats cut or sustaining some other personal injury," he wrote. "The strain upon a consular officer in the interior of Asia Minor, ten days journey from any official support or assistance, is considerable."[42] Finally, in 1906, Jewett was granted his wish to leave Sivas and was named consul in Trebizond. The records indicate that the Department of State had every intention of assigning a new consul to Sivas, but for whatever reason this was never done. It remained to the missionary Dr. Charles E. Clark, as temporary vice consul, to make the final arrangements for closing the consulate in March 1908, thus bringing to a close this chapter in the U.S. presence in historic Lesser Armenia.[43]

U.S. Consul Milo A. Jewett

[42] Despatches from Sivas, no. 76, March 25, 1896.

[43] On the final months of the Sivas consulate, see Records of the U.S. Consulate in Sivas, vol. 6: Despatches, 1906, 1907, 1908.